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Article

The Federal Arbitration Act, Rules of Decision,
and Congress’ Exercise of Judicial Power
Anthony J. Meyer†
INTRODUCTION
Long before this Article’s germination, Professor David Schwartz
quipped that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “is unconstitutional . . .
and no one has noticed.”1 The observation is both delightfully sardonic
and—for a variety of reasons, including those expounded in this Article—true. Professor Schwartz asserts a brilliantly creative thesis regarding federal court decisional law as applied in state courts, arguing
that though state courts are not bound by Congress’ control, they
nonetheless enforce the FAA as though they were.2 Yet in the nearly
two decades since Professor Schwartz put forth his thesis, it appears
the argument has not caught on.
This Article asserts a different challenge to the FAA’s
† J.D., University of Missouri–Columbia, 2018; M.A., Truman State University,
2012; B.A., Knox College, 2009. In law school, Anthony Meyer was Managing Editor of
the Missouri Law Review, and, upon graduating, he served as a law clerk to the Honorable Paul C. Wilson of the Supreme Court of Missouri. He is an attorney with Lear Werts
LLP in Columbia, Missouri, specializing in employment, consumer protection, and complex litigation. He is licensed to practice law in California and Missouri. He thanks his
colleagues—Brad Lear, Sander Sowers, and Todd Werts—for their support and mentorship. Many thanks also to Brian Moody for entertaining ideas like this and for being
an excellent writing partner and friend. The author extends his special thanks to Brigid
Burroughs for her superlative work as a research assistant on this article. Brigid graduated from the University of Missouri–Kansas City School of Law in May of 2021, where
she served as a managing editor of the UMKC Law Review. And thanks to the Minnesota
Law Review staff for their keen editing. Copyright © 2021 by Anthony J. Meyer.
1. David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over
State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 541 (2004). Of course, that “no one” has noticed is hyperbole, for many observers have levied cogent criticism against the FAA’s constitutional foundation. See, e.g., Matthew J. Stanford, Odd Man Out: A Comparative Critique
of the Federal Arbitration Act’s Article III Shortcomings, 105 CAL. L. REV. 929 (2017);
Roger J. Perlstadt, Article III Judicial Power and the Federal Arbitration Act, 62 AM. U. L.
REV. 201 (2012).
2. See generally Schwartz, supra note 1.
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constitutional validity concerning the separation of power between
the judicial and legislative branches at the federal level, not the division between the states and the federal government. The thesis parallels that of Professor Schwartz, though, because it is largely theoretical
rather than practical, for it is almost unthinkable that any court—let
alone the Supreme Court of the United States—would suddenly conclude the FAA violates the United States Constitution. After all, the FAA
has withstood constitutional challenges for decades, including some
that were straightforward and (seemingly) meritorious, such as
whether Congress has the power to preempt the states’ contract laws.3
The Court, furthermore, has emerged as an ardent supporter of the
FAA and a broader policy favoring nonjudicial arbitration. The reasons for the FAA’s longevity are complicated, and a full dissertation is
beyond the scope of this Article. But there can be no doubt that policies favoring arbitration are so entrenched in the American economy
and American jurisprudence that any uncertainty as to the enforceability of arbitration agreements would wreak chaos in both systems.
Indeed, Supreme Court decisions broadly favoring arbitration reached
a fever pitch around the turn of the twenty-first century, when a national, newly connected economy and stress on overloaded federal
court dockets both reached an apogee.4
But the constitutional underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s approach deserve attention, even skepticism. This Article argues the FAA
violates the Constitution because it creates a prohibited rule of decision, whereby Congress directs courts to make a judicial finding when
they are presented with a certain set of facts. For this reason, the FAA
violates the separation of powers principles in the United States Constitution.5
3. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
4. See discussion infra Part I.C.
5. As much as there should be skepticism of arbitration agreements imposed in
contracts of adhesion where there is unequal bargaining power between the parties,
see generally, Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 184–
85 (2015) (characterizing the unequal bargaining power of many arbitration agreements), the principle motivating this Article is not the unconscionability of arbitration
agreements for some employees and consumers. Arbitration—to paraphrase the great
film Shane—is a tool for resolving disputes no better or no worse than any other, or
the party who wields it. See SHANE (Paramount Pictures 1953). Indeed, there are also
scenarios where arbitration is a disfavored process for those in power, as is the case
for some insurance companies under agreements pursuant to MO. REV. STAT. § 537.065
in Missouri. See Recent Bad Faith Litigation Decisions, PLEBAN PETRUSKA LAW L.L.C. (Dec.
31, 2020), https://plebanlaw.com/recent-bad-faith-litigation-decisions [https://
perma.cc/89NA-9GXH] (explaining that pursuant to statute, a plaintiff in a personal
injury case may, prior to arbitration, agree with a defendant to collect an award only
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Whether this legal proposition is correct is an open question.
Based on the research underlying this Article, no reported case has
presented this argument to the United States Supreme Court and only
one United States Court of Appeals has addressed the argument (the
Second Circuit, with abbreviated analysis).6 Notably, this argument
(or one substantially similar to it) has been presented to at least one
United States District Court and two state high courts, but to no avail.7
Part I of this Article provides a critical history of the FAA. In recounting the social, economic, and judicial history of the FAA, the Article provides a review of the Supreme Court’s decisional law interpreting the FAA, including recent decisions wherein the Roberts
Court—with its changing personnel—has pared back some of the
FAA’s applicability.8 Part II provides a primer on impermissible rules
of decisions and the Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. The doctrine prohibiting rules of decision is not often invoked
in litigation, so a comprehensive review is warranted. Part III argues
the FAA creates an impermissible rule of decision. In short, because
the Supreme Court has held the FAA creates a substantive contract
remedy, a federal district court evaluating whether to award that remedy based upon the facts presented to it should retain the freedom to
award any other substantive contract remedy warranted by the
from a defendant’s insurance company, resulting in insurance companies having to pay
for judgments they did not have a chance to defend). Or when a defendant is forced to
pay the entirety of the arbitrator’s fee for each class member of a class action case. See
AM. ARBIT. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 20, 24, 37 (2016),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/87QN-GRBB] (emphasizing fairness in consumer arbitration proceedings). All in
all, where knowledgeable parties mutually agree to be bound by an arbitrator’s
award—at any point in time—arbitration is a useful tool. The impetus of this Article is,
rather, a belief in the constitutional authority of an independent judiciary. See infra
Part IV.B.
6. This data comes from a Westlaw search of the United States Supreme Court,
federal courts of appeals, federal district courts, state supreme courts, and law reviews.
The search was limited by “FAA” and “separation of powers,” “arbitration” and “separation of powers,” “FAA” and “Article III,” and “arbitration” and “Article III.” This proposition reflects all relevant case law and secondary sources encompassed by these
search terms and limitations.
7. Katz v. Cellco Partnership, No. 12-CV-9193, 2013 WL 6621022 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2013) (presenting this argument to the Southern District of New York); Firelock
Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989); Atwater v. Commissioner of Education,
957 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. 2011) (presenting closely analogous arguments). These cases
are discussed in depth below. See infra Part III.
8. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 534–35 (2019) (removing employer-employee contracts and contracts involving independent contractors from the
FAA’s coverage).
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circumstances. Part IV discusses the implications of such an argument.
I. A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE FAA
The purpose of this history is two-fold. The first is to bear witness
to the Supreme Court’s conversion in its arbitration jurisprudence. Because of its effect on lower court dockets throughout the nation, the
Court’s radical about-face regarding the desirability of arbitration is
as dramatic as almost any in the Court’s history—on par with the famous “switch in time to save nine” during the Court’s consideration of
New Deal era laws9 or the Court’s evolving views of substantive due
process.10 Indeed, although the Court was once downright hostile to
arbitration, in the 1990s and 2000s, it became almost completely deferential to the process.
The second purpose of this history is to establish the doctrinal
background for the argument that the FAA is an impermissible rule of
decision. Accordingly, this history recounts the Court’s treatment of
the law as a substantive contract remedy—a substantive, not procedural, rule. Because this error has been so compounded over the
years, the constitutional underpinnings of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence is now a hopeless thicket.
A. EARLY HISTORY
The FAA is a federal statute, passed under Congress’ power to
regulate interstate commerce.11 It was enacted in 1925 and intended
to put arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.12 Just prior to the FAA’s passage, the Supreme Court signaled
its acquiescence to arbitration as an extra-judicial remedy. In Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., the Court allowed a state to authorize
arbitration, so long as common law remedies were preserved.13 Red
Cross Line essentially provided Congress an ex ante assurance the FAA
9. See John Q. Barrett, Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’s 1937 Quip, “A Switch in
Time’ll Save Nine,” 73 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2021).
10. For example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965), expressly
rejected economic freedom as a right protected by substantive due process as presented in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 265 (1994).
12. See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 103, 110
(2002).
13. 264 U.S. 109 (1924). It is important to note, however, the Court’s narrow
reading of the right at issue—that litigants must be able to effectuate common law
remedies.
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would withstand the Court’s judicial review.
The historical and legislative background of the FAA is well documented.14 Notably, some commentators have suggested the FAA and
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were “part of the same movement to simplify court procedures, relieve overcrowded judicial dockets, and provide for improved, efficient methods of resolving disputes.”15 Congress intended to support a system of arbitration of contractual
disputes among consenting merchants on co-equal footing with limited involvement from the federal courts.16 Arbitration was, thus,
meant as a “safety valve” for commercial disputes that needed to be
resolved quickly.17 This was fitting, for in 1925, it was not so easy to
be a national business. Expanding businesses faced growing legal uncertainty directly proportional to their increasing geographic
scope. And it would have been very costly for a business to be haled
into court from across the county.18 Accordingly, the FAA provided
predictability and efficiency, particularly as businesses headquartered on the East Coast or in the industrial centers of the Great Lakes
and Midwestern regions expanded throughout the country.19
The FAA contains the following provisions. Section 1 outlines the
scope of the law, including maritime transactions and transactions involving commerce,20 but it excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”21 Section 2 is the heart of the law,
requiring that arbitration agreements covered by the law “shall be
14. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 274, 279. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
(Oxford University Press 1992) (examining the history of American arbitration law).
15. Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of
History Symposium, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 119 (2016).
16. Id. at 122, 126.
17. Id. at 132.
18. It is likely not coincidental that the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine developed shortly thereafter to allow for more predictability in litigation exposure for
businesses. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. For information on this historical context, see Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach to the Federal Arbitration
Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499 (1995).
And largely in service of these national businesses, the American Arbitration Association was founded in 1926. See Our Mission, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/
mission [https://perma.cc/25PW-NMXF].
20. This usage of “commerce” has been interpreted to be coextensive with Congress’ authority under the commerce clause. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct.
532, 534 (2019).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity.”22
The remaining sections are largely procedural. For instance, sections 3 through 9 concern what happens before, during, and immediately after arbitration. Section 3 provides that courts must stay their
proceedings upon application of one of the parties.23 Section 4 outlines the procedure by which a party who is aggrieved by a failure to
initiate arbitration may obtain an order for the same.24 Section 5 provides guidelines for selecting an arbitrator should one not be named
or there be a lapse.25 Section 6 simply states an application to compel
arbitration shall be heard as a motion.26 Section 7 provides additional
lawful procedures that may be employed during an arbitration itself.27
Section 8 provides special procedures related to admiralty law.28 Section 9 allows the arbitrator’s award to be entered as a judgment by a
court.29
Sections 10 through 16 cover the remaining steps in the arbitration process, some special circumstances, and the right to appeal. Section 10 outlines grounds for vacating the arbitration award.30 Section
11 outlines the modification powers granted to federal courts having
jurisdiction of an award where a mistake was made in the award.31
Section 12 provides for notice where a party to a lawsuit intends to
invoke a right to arbitration.32 Section 13 states what must be filed in
court when a party seeks judicial enforcement of an award.33 Section
14 provides a time limitation (likely now entirely irrelevant—prior to
January 1, 1926) for the FAA’s scope.34 Section 15 states the Act of
State doctrine shall not apply to the FAA—meaning foreign sovereigns
may submit to arbitration to be enforced by United States courts,

22. Id. § 2.
23. Id. § 3.
24. Id. § 4.
25. Id. § 5.
26. Id. § 6.
27. Id. § 7.
28. Id. § 8.
29. Id. § 9.
30. Id. § 10. These include, inter alia, if the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; where there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrator or other misconduct; or where the arbitrator exceeded their powers. Id.
31. Id. § 11.
32. Id. § 12.
33. Id. § 13.
34. Id. § 14.
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should they so choose.35 Finally, Section 16 outlines the procedure for
appeals.36
What to make of the FAA’s text? By far the majority of sections
are procedural in nature. But if there is a substantive right to be found,
it is in Section 2, providing that arbitration agreements shall be valid
and irrevocable.37 Further, the intent of Congress in passing the FAA
is fairly demonstrated from the plain language of the text—to encourage arbitration and bring legitimacy to those agreements in the eyes
of the courts. Nevertheless, if Congress’ intent in passing the FAA was
to require courts to stay proceedings and refer a matter to arbitration,
it took some time for courts to effectuate that intent.38
For instance, the Supreme Court demonstrated its base-line hostility in one pre-FAA case:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke
the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him. A man
may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights . . . . In a
civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right
to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to
which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.39

And state courts were similarly hostile prior to the passage of the FAA.
The Alabama Supreme Court, for example, held in 1918 that pre-dispute arbitration provisions were void as a violation of public policy.40
The Virginia Supreme Court similarly held a party may freely withdraw from a pre-dispute arbitration agreement because a private
agreement could not bar a person from seeking redress in the courts.41
Even after passage of the FAA, the Supreme Court remained skeptical. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the Court decried
35. Id. § 15.
36. Id. § 16. This appellate procedure does not apply to the states. In Missouri, for
example, the appellate process is a combination of writs and merits appeals. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
38. See Alison Brooke Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139–42 (1986) (suggesting courts were historically hostile to arbitration both because arbitration was seen as an impermissible
ouster of court jurisdiction and because courts would be deprived of the fees charged
to hear a case).
39. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
40. Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 80 So. 466, 467 (Ala. 1918).
41. Rison v. Moon, 22 S.E. 165, 166–67 (Va. 1895).
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arbitration as an alternative to judicial dispute resolution:
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury . . . . Arbitrators do not have the
benefit of judicial instruction on the law [and] need not give their reasons for
their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a
court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial
review of a trial.42

Taking the long view, however, the Court’s skepticism was shortlived.
B. MID-CENTURY REVIVAL
The FAA and arbitration generally occupied a minimal role in
both the Court’s jurisprudence and society at large until the Court’s
1967 decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.43 There, Prima Paint purchased Flood & Conklin’s (F&C) paint
business, then entered into a six-year consulting agreement with F&C,
whereby F&C’s chair would personally provide advice to Prima Paint
regarding the business.44 The consulting agreement contained a broad
arbitration clause encompassing “[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to [the] [a]greement.”45 Thereafter, Prima Paint alleged F&C was insolvent and unable to perform its contractual obligations, and, in fact, had filed for bankruptcy just a week after the agreement was signed.46 F&C responded with a notice of intent to arbitrate,
whereupon Prima Paint filed suit alleging fraud in the inducement and
seeking an order enjoining the arbitration.47 Following the district
court’s granting F&C’s motion to stay the proceedings and enforce arbitration, Prima Paint appealed to the Second Circuit, which dismissed
the appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.48 The question
presented was whether a claim for fraud in the inducement of an entire contract was to be resolved by an arbitrator or federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction when the contract also contained an arbitration clause.49
In affirming the lower court’s dismissal of Prima Paint’s appeal,
the Court held the case could proceed to arbitration, so long as Prima
Paint had not alleged it was fraudulently induced to agree to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); accord Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953).
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 402.
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arbitrate.50 Importantly, because the case arose out of federal courts’
diversity jurisdiction, the Court had to decide whether the FAA was a
procedural or substantive rule under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.51
The Court held that the FAA was substantive law and issued a broad
holding in favor of arbitration.52
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, penned a
short but thorough dissent.53 He expressed exasperation with the
Court’s legal conclusion: “The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that
the legal issue of a contract’s voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising
out of a valid contract between the parties.”54 He further stated,
[I]t is clear that Congress intended the Act to be applicable in diversity cases
involving interstate commerce and maritime contracts, and to hold the Act
inapplicable . . . would be severely to limit its impact. As to the second alternative, it is clear that Congress . . . relied primarily on its power to create general federal rules to govern federal courts.55

Finally, while also expressing his dissenting viewpoint regarding
whether the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ full authority under the Commerce Clause, Justice Black argued the FAA was also contrary to ordinarily accepted principles of contract law: “And the Court
approves a rule which is not only contrary to state law, but contrary
to the intention of the parties and to accepted principles of contract
law—a rule which indeed elevates arbitration provisions above all
other contractual provisions. [T]hat result was clearly not intended by
Congress.”56
Following the majority’s signaling of strong judicial support for
arbitration agreements, though, use of those agreements only increased.57 Notwithstanding, arbitration agreements remained primarily a business-to-business tool, as they had been in Prima Paint.58
The exponential increase in the use of arbitration agreements in all
contracts, but especially consumer contracts, came after the Court’s
50. Id. at 406.
51. Id. at 404–05 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
52. Id. at 405–06.
53. Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 417–18.
56. Id. at 411. For a discussion of how these contract principles are still relevant,
see infra Part III.
57. See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration
-epidemic [https://perma.cc/B64U-5EKL].
58. See id.
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next big arbitration case, Southland Corp. v. Keating.59
In that case, a putative class of 7-Eleven convenience franchisees
filed suit in California state court against Southland Corporation, the
owner and franchisor, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and breach
of contract arising out of a business dispute.60 The California Superior
Court refused to compel arbitration, but the California Court of Appeal
reversed.61 Southland appealed, and the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, holding that claims under the state’s Franchise Investment Law were not arbitrable.62 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari to answer the question of whether
Congress could preempt contrary state statutes on arbitration.63
The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding the
FAA categorically foreclosed the provisions in the Franchise Investment Law purporting to govern arbitration agreements.64 The Court’s
characterization of arbitration is integral to the Southland decision.
The Court cited Prima Paint in reasoning that Congress has broad constitutional authority to “fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”65 Therefore, according to the Court, arbitration is a
remedy authorized by Congress, not a procedure.
Justice O’Connor authored a pointed dissent, which Justice
Rehnquist joined, arguing the FAA was a procedural statute.66 Justice
O’Connor characterized Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion as enforcing a “newly-discovered” federal right.67 With brutal honesty, Justice O’Connor attacked the majority opinion as unreasoned, “unnecessary,” “unfaithful to congressional intent,” and motivated “by an
understandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration.”68
59. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
60. Id. at 3–4.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 7–8.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 11 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395,
400 (1967)).
66. Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens authored a
short concurrence, concluding that even though Congress originally intended the FAA
as a procedural statute, “intervening developments” in the law supported the Court’s
conclusion. Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 22 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 22, 24, 36. Subsequent commentators have provided support that the
Court’s statutory interpretation was erroneous. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted
by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101 (2006).
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Nevertheless, because the Southland majority and not Justice
O’Connor’s dissenting opinion carried the day, the Court has conceptualized arbitration as a substantive contract remedy ever since. Of
course, that is not to say the Court got it right; the balance of scholarship analyzing Southland suggests Justice O’Connor’s view was the
correct one.69 Nonetheless, following Southland, arbitration agreements became ubiquitous in all types of contracts in the American legal landscape, including consumer contracts.70
C. INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Arbitration reached its zenith at the turn of the twenty-first century, a time of globalization marked by the rise of international corporations. At least three cases stand as cornerstones of the Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence of this era: Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson; and AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion.71
Doctor’s Associates concerned a state law that provided arbitration agreements were enforceable only when the clause was typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.72 When the
franchisee of a Subway restaurant challenged a franchise agreement
containing a putatively noncompliant arbitration provision, the franchisor sought to stay the suit pending arbitration.73 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the state law directly conflicted with Section 2 of the FAA and was, therefore, preempted.74 This was the first
blow (of several) to the notion that state legislatures could experiment
with some of the procedural provisions of the FAA, or that state courts
could somehow creep out of the FAA’s long shadow.75
In Rent-A-Center, an employee who filed suit alleging race discrimination argued the arbitration agreement he signed was unconscionable under state contract law.76 The arbitration agreement,
69. Note, State Courts and the Federalization of Arbitration Law, 134 HARV. L. REV.
1184, 1185 (2021) (citing Drahozal, supra note 12).
70. See Stone & Colvin, supra note 57.
71. 517 U.S. 681 (1996); 561 U.S. 63 (2010); 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
72. 517 U.S. at 683.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 686–87.
75. See Schwartz, supra note 1. But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The ‘Sanctuary
City’ Syndrome Reaches Arbitration: State Supreme Courts Defy Federalization, 11 PENN.
ST. ARB. L. REV. 1 (2019) (analyzing how some courts have obstinately refused to enforce arbitration clauses).
76. 561 U.S. at 65–66.
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however, contained a delegation provision, which purported to delegate exclusive authority to the arbitrator to resolve all disputes—including whether the contract as a whole was valid under the FAA.77
The Supreme Court held that because the employee challenged the entire contract—as opposed to the delegation provision standing
alone—the arbitrator would be the one to determine the contract’s
enforceability.78 The Court reasoned, “An agreement to arbitrate a
gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party
seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any
other.”79 Notably for the purposes of this Article, Justice Stevens remarked in his dissent how, ordinarily, courts must determine the enforceability of a contract.80 And of course, so-called delegation provisions, operating as a further barrier to plaintiffs hoping to avoid
arbitration, bloomed in the wake of Rent-A-Center.
Last, in AT&T v. Concepcion—a heated, 5–4 decision—the lower
court refused to compel arbitration on a class level, relying on a state
supreme court precedent holding class arbitration waivers were unconscionable in consumer contracts.81 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding the FAA preempted state common law rules on unconscionability in arbitration agreements.82 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, pointed out how state courts frequently used state common law to
find arbitration provisions unconscionable.83 The Court voiced both
its strongest support of the FAA and, simultaneously, its greatest excoriation of state court decisions to the contrary:
Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, it does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. As we have said, a
federal statute’s saving clause “cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a
common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be
held to destroy itself.”84

Justice Breyer authored a dissent, arguing in part that the Court ordinarily did not hold that Congress intended to preempt the laws of the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 70–72.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
563 U.S. 333, 338 (2011).
See id. at 340, 352.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
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sovereign states so “cavalierly.”85
All in all, the Court’s FAA jurisprudence of the 1990s and 2000s
can only be characterized as expressing a strong preference in upholding arbitration agreements, even nearing total deference. Though
commentators should rightly hesitate to profess an understanding of
the Court’s motivations (especially respecting the Justices’ political
ideologies), one reason seems obvious (and apolitical): arbitration
considerably lessens the pressure on federal court dockets. Indeed, at
the same time the Court seemingly expressed so much support for arbitration as a policy matter, there was also a proliferation of lawsuits
filed in the federal courts.86 While it might also be true that this phase
of the Court’s jurisprudence corresponds to the rise of global companies and markets, this latter policy consideration might have been just
as salient to the Court.
D. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
The Court’s contemporary arbitration jurisprudence does not
lend itself to broad generalization. On the one hand, the Court seems
to have retreated from the high-water mark favoring arbitration
agreements and striking down state court decisions to the contrary,
especially in the consumer and employment contexts. On the other,
the Court seems to have returned to first principles of the FAA, which
do not favor quite as expansive a reading.
In New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the Court considered whether the
FAA applied to a truck driver classified as an independent contractor
when a driver brought a class action for failing to comply with the Fair
Labor Standards Act and other state labor laws.87 The Court answered
in the negative, holding courts should decide whether an exclusion to
the FAA applies before compelling arbitration.88 And, in this case,
there was a valid exclusion because section 1 of the FAA expressly excludes “contracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce.”89 The Court reasoned the federal court itself had to
consider this question before staying the litigation for arbitration.90
85. Id. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. See generally Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court
-management-statistics [https://perma.cc/B8TB-8BBH] (recording historical docket
numbers).
87. 139 S. Ct. 532, 534 (2019).
88. Id. at 537.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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The Court’s decision in New Prime signals both a return to the original
understanding of the FAA and perhaps some discomfort with the expansive reading the statute has received in the past. At least (and as a
preview of the argument ahead) the Court has signaled a willingness
to allow lower courts to answer threshold questions of arbitration.91
Even reading New Prime as signaling some discomfort from the
Roberts Court with the Court’s expansive arbitration jurisprudence,
the Court remains a true believer in arbitration as a fair and valid nonjudicial remedy. What is more, the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence
is decidedly settled, with all foundational questions answered by the
time of the Rehnquist Court. Accordingly, it is critical to recognize the
Court does not write on a blank slate in its arbitration jurisprudence.
II. IMPERMISSIBLE RULES OF DECISIONS
A “rule of decision” is a legislative pronouncement that usurps a
court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the circumstances before it and thus requires a court to reach a predetermined result.92 Because rules of decision necessarily involve one branch of government
exercising the power of another, they are prohibited in the United
States’ tripartite system of government, with its three co-equal
branches.93 In the Court’s most recent case discussing rules of decision, Justice Thomas summarized this doctrine:
The Constitution creates three branches of Government and vests each
branch with a different type of power. To the legislative department has been
committed the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing
them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases
properly brought before the courts. By vesting each branch with an exclusive
form of power, the Framers kept those powers separate. Each branch “exercise[s] . . . the powers appropriate to its own department,” and no branch can
“encroach upon the powers confided to the others.” This system prevents

91. Compare id., with Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (upholding delegation provisions). The tension between the text of the FAA and the
Court’s doctrines is again at issue in one of the cases docketed for the Court’s current
term, Badgerow v. Walters, 975 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 209 L. Ed. 2d
748 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 20-1143). That case presents the question of “[w]hether
federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration
award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA where the only basis for jurisdiction is that
the underlying dispute involved a federal question.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
I, Badgerow v. Walters, 209 L. Ed. 2d 748 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 20-1143).
92. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322–23 (2016) (citing Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2014) and Brief of Amici
Curiae Former Senior Officials of the Office of Legal Counsel in Support of Respondents
at 3, 6, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770)).
93. See id.
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“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands”—an accumulation that would pose an inherent “threat to liberty.”94

The judicial power, as Marbury v. Madison emphatically makes
clear, is the power to “say what the law is,” namely to “expound and
interpret” a rule when applying that rule to particular cases.95 The
other branches accordingly may not intrude on this power, though
they, of course, have powers of their own.96 The executive branch, for
instance, is prohibited from exercising the power of judicial review.97
And Congress may not “require federal courts to exercise judicial
power in a manner that Article III forbids.”98 Congress prescribes an
impermissible rule of decision when it takes from the court “the
power to interpret and apply the law to the circumstances before it.”99
Stating the issue slightly differently: “To distinguish between permissible exercises of the legislative power and impermissible infringements of the judicial power, this Court’s precedents establish the following rule: Congress violates Article III when it ‘compel[s] . . .
findings or results under old law.’ But Congress does not violate Article III when it ‘changes the law.’”100
The Court infrequently invokes the doctrine prohibiting rules of
decision. Likely, in most cases, there is no question as to Congress’
power to act relative to the judicial branch. But perhaps because of its
infrequency in the Court’s opinions, the contours of the doctrine are
not sharply defined. There do not seem to be “rules of decision” cases
the same way there are “standing” cases. Most often when the Court
opines on rules of decision, it does so by way of discussing the separation of powers principles. Nonetheless, the doctrine prohibiting rules
of decision is fundamental to the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence,
beginning with Marbury v. Madison—which in part held Congress
could not expand the federal courts’ jurisdiction beyond the scope
94. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904–05 (2018) (citations omitted).
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
96. A full discussion of the separation of powers principle, including what powers
are distributed to which branches, is necessarily beyond the scope of this Article. For
a comprehensive discussion, see Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346 (2016), and 16 FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET
AL., CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 274 (Aug. 2021 update).
97. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (citing Hayburn’s
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 113, (1948)).
98. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218.
99. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016).
100. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (citations omitted).
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contemplated by the Constitution101—and continuing through a handful of doctrinal cases.102
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc. was the first significant case in this
recent line.103 In Plaut, the Court considered whether Congress could
require federal courts to reopen final judgments based on section 27
of the Securities and Exchange Act.104 That section, in essence, was intended to institute a longer statute of limitations for cases that were
dismissed under a judicially created statute of limitations.105 After the
district court and court of appeals both found the law to be unconstitutional, the Court granted certiorari.106 The Court held this provision
violated the separation of powers.107 Justice Scalia first noted the historical importance of the separation of powers: “This sense of a sharp
necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power,
prompted by the crescendo of legislative interference with private
judgments of the courts, triumphed among the Framers of the new
Federal Constitution . . . .”108 Section 27 was unconstitutional because
it required a federal court—which had previously adjudicated the
statute of limitations—to “reverse a determination once made, in a
particular case.”109 The Court succinctly identified the nature of the
problem: “Having achieved finality . . . a judicial decision becomes the
last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case
or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than
what the courts said it was.”110
Next, in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Court considered the doctrine in the fraught international relations context of the seized assets
of the Central Bank of Iran.111 The question presented was whether
section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012 violated the separation of powers principle.112 As Justice Ginsburg remarked, section 8772 was an “unusual statute” because it went
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
See, e.g., Patchak, 138 S. Ct. 897.
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
Id. at 213.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 221; see also id. at 221–25 (collecting authorities).
Id. at 225 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton)).
Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316–17 (2016).
Id. at 1317.
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so far as to state judgments in a pending case, identified by its docket
number, could be satisfied by certain seized assets.113 Nonetheless,
the Court held that Congress was not exercising judicial power: “Congress, our decisions make clear, may amend the law and make the
change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is outcome determinative.”114 The Court did not view section 8772 as directing a judgment, however.115 Instead, it viewed the statute as directing the Court to apply a “new legal standard to undisputed
facts.”116 In other words, Congress acted by amending the law applicable to a given case, which the courts were duty bound to apply.117
The Court thus rejected the close-enough argument that section 8772
created a foregone conclusion in a certain case—there was still something left for “judicial determination.”118
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Sotomayor, authored a vigorous dissent.119 He believed the law was unconstitutional because it
was an example of Congress assuming “the role of judge and decid[ing] a particular pending case in the first instance.”120 He further
criticized the majority for its technical reading of the statute; he would
have looked to the purpose of the statute and its obvious effect on adjudication in the federal courts.121
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on rules of decision
came in 2018 in Patchak v. Zinke.122 The petitioner in that case challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to take a property,
called the Bradley Property, into a trust.123 During the pendency of the
litigation below, Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act), which expressly stated both that the Bradley
Property could be taken into trust and that any case challenging that
action should be dismissed.124 When the Court was presented the
question whether the Gun Lake Act was a prohibited rule of decision
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1325.
117. Id. at 1323.
118. Id. at 1326; see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 438
(1992) (holding that a statute “compelled changes in law, not findings or results under
old law” and, accordingly, was not a prohibited rule of decision).
119. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329–38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1332.
121. Id. at 1332, 1335.
122. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
123. Id. at 902–03.
124. Id. at 904.
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with respect to the petitioner’s lawsuit, the Court held there was no
separation of powers violation.125 The Court reasoned that the statute
was a jurisdiction-stripping statute, which the Court has held was well
within Congress’ authority by virtue of its constitutional control over
the lower federal courts.126 As Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality
of Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, and Justice Kagan, stated:
Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act,
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Now they do not. This kind of legal change is well within Congress’ authority
and does not violate Article III . . . . Our conclusion that § 2(b) is jurisdictional
is bolstered by the fact that it cannot plausibly be read as anything else. Section 2(b) is not one of the nonjurisdictional rules that this Court’s precedents
have identified as “important and mandatory” but not governing “a court’s
adjudicatory capacity.” Section 2(b) does not identify “an element of [the]
plaintiff’s claim for relief” or otherwise define its “substantive adequacy.” Nor is it a “claim-processing rule,” like a filing deadline or an exhaustion requirement, that requires the parties to “take certain procedural steps
at certain specified times.”127

The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that mandatory language violated Article III, saying that language “simply impose[d] the consequences,” rather than directing a decision.128
Chief Justice Roberts again dissented, this time joined by Justices
Kennedy and Gorsuch.129 He argued Congress exercised the judicial
power in this case by manipulating jurisdiction to direct an individual
outcome, announcing a rule of law particular to an individual case.130
What generalizations can be drawn from these cases? First, the
Court’s interpretation of the law at issue is critical to deciding whether
a law is an impermissible rule of decision. If the purpose of the law is
to limit federal court jurisdiction or to provide or amend the substantive law, the law is constitutional. But if the purpose of the law is to
direct judicial action under existing law in a manner in which the judiciary ordinarily would not act, the law is unconstitutional. Indeed,
the Court has remained steadfast that Congress “may not exercise [its
authority] . . . in a way that requires a federal court to act unconstitutionally.”131 Second, what is clear from reading the Court’s cases is
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 905–06 (citations omitted).
Id. at 908.
Id. at 914–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 918.
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 n.19 (2016).
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that, while Congress plainly may strip courts of jurisdiction, override
judicial interpretations, and amend its laws, even to the point of
achieving a predetermined result when the judicial power is exercised, Congress may not compel the exercise of the judicial power in a
certain manner in the first instance. After all, the judiciary is—and remains—a co-equal, independent branch.
III. HOW THE FAA CREATES AN IMPERMISSIBLE RULE OF
DECISION
As demonstrated, the Supreme Court has consistently held the
FAA is a substantive—not procedural—law.132 Arbitration is, thus, a
coercive remedy courts may award an aggrieved litigant, to the detriment of another. The awarding of a remedy in a lawsuit, however, is
inherently an exercise of judicial power, whereby a court makes a ruling as a matter of law when presented with a certain set of facts.133
Accordingly, because the FAA directs judicial action—the awarding of
a remedy—it is an unconstitutional rule of decision and violates the
separation of powers principle.
At least two qualifying observations are in order, to be sure. The
first is a return to the notion that the Court is not writing on a blank
slate in its arbitration cases. Were the Court presented with this thesis
without the precedents of Prima Paint and Southland, it seems likely
the Court would conclude the FAA is a procedural statute, well within
Congressional authority to adopt.134 But the decisions holding the FAA
to be a substantive remedy were plainly intended to keep arbitration
agreements viable in diversity suits under the Erie doctrine.135 As a
result, the Court is now in a double bind. If Southland is correct that
the FAA is a substantive and not procedural statute, it is also true that
courts are not compelled to enforce the FAA as a contract remedy in
all circumstances, though they may continue to do so at their option
in adjudicating disputes.136
The second is that though this Article frames the FAA as creating
a rule of decision, many rules of decision cases focus on individual
matters or cases—not all arbitration cases throughout time. The
132. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (citing Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967)).
133. See Marbury v. Madison¸ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803).
134. For example, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within
scattered sections of title 28 of the United State Code.
135. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404–05.
136. See infra Part IV for an expanded discussion of this point.
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hypothetical statute “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins” stands as a contrast
to the FAA’s general pronouncements.137 But this point is purely a semantic one, because this thesis could just as easily be stated as either
that the FAA creates a standing rule of decision or that the FAA continuously creates a rule of decision. In either framing, however, the
FAA directs an exercise of the judicial power by requiring courts to
award a certain remedy whenever presented with a certain set of
facts.
But that exercise of judicial power does not have to be so. Courts
have made clear that arbitration agreements are mere contracts.138
However, when a party files a lawsuit in the face of an existing arbitration agreement, that party has breached that agreement. When
faced with any breach of contract case, a court has choices in the remedies it may award. The court may, for instance:
• Enter a judgment for specific performance;
• Enter a judgment awarding money damages;
• Order the return of property under the contract;
• Order equitable relief, including a constructive trust, an equitable lien, and subrogation; and
• Order cancellation or a reformation of the contract’s writing.139
In adjudicating a purported breach of contract, the court must ascertain how to remedy the breach; the court does not ab initio ask what
law compels it to enter which remedy. Arbitration, instead, is one remedy a court (with requisite jurisdictional capacity) may order in the
face of a breach of contract.
This conclusion is consistent with leading persuasive authority
on contract law.140 The Restatement, for instance, provides for several
different judicial remedies, including the following: awarding a sum of
money as damages or to prevent unjust enrichment, requiring specific
performance, enjoining non-performance, ordering restoration to
avoid unjust enrichment, and declaring the rights of the parties.141 But
because the FAA compels courts to enter one—and only one—remedy
in contract cases when presented with certain facts, it is an impermissible exercise of the judicial power.
137. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
138. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“[A]rbitration is a
matter of contract.”).
139. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.2 (4th ed. 2004).
140. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
141. Id.
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Importantly, the FAA differs from the laws found not to be rules
of decisions in the Court’s recent cases.142 Remember the Court has
made clear that the FAA provides a substantive remedy that courts
must enforce.143 The FAA is fundamentally unlike the law at issue in
Patchak because it is not a jurisdiction-stripping statute.144 And it is
unlike the law in Bank Markazi because it does not apply to individual
lawsuits, but all lawsuits.145 It is, however, like the law at issue in Plaut
because it directs a certain judicial action.146
As of this writing, only one federal district court in the country
has addressed this Article’s thesis and conclusion. The argument was
briefed and argued before the Southern District of New York in Katz v.
Cellco Partnership.147 In Katz, customers alleged Verizon imposed a
hidden rate increase in their service contracts.148 Verizon moved to
compel arbitration.149 The customers argued the application of the
FAA to state law claims violated Article III and was an unconstitutional
rule of decision.150 The court rejected these arguments, holding:
There is insufficient state action for plaintiff to maintain an action under Article III; applying the FAA to compel arbitration of these claims does not violate Article III both because the FAA is not an incursion on the separation of powers and because plaintiff waived his personal right to an Article
III forum by agreeing to arbitrate; and the FAA does not impose an unconstitutional rule of decision.151

More so, the court found the case did not implicate the separation of
powers in the first place: “[W]hen Congress encourages or merely enforces a private agreement to resolve disputes outside courts, no such
concerns regarding the separation of powers are implicated because
Congress is not withdrawing any matter from judicial cognizance.”152
This ipse dixit raises more questions than it answers. Why and
how, for instance, are arbitration cases not withdrawn from judicial
142. It bears noting that the FAA is distinguishable from the laws at issue in Bank
Markazi, Seattle Audubon, and Plaut because those cases dealt with Congress amending
the law during a pending case. Nonetheless, it is still useful to draw a comparison to
those laws because there are so few examples of “rules of decision” cases.
143. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
144. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905–06 (2018).
145. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016).
146. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217 (1995).
147. No. 12-CV-9193, 2013 WL 6621022 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013).
148. Id., at *1.
149. Id.
150. Id., at *4.
151. Id., at *5.
152. Id., at *9.
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cognizance? Cases holding courts must immediately transfer cases to
arbitrators even without determining arbitrability suggest the contrary.153 More so, if courts maintain their judicial cognizance, why and
how are courts prevented from entering one of the other remedies
available to them in ordinary contracts cases?154
The customers in Katz appealed to the Second Circuit. There, the
court affirmed the district court’s decision without further analysis.155
Accordingly, the Southern District of New York’s order remains the
most extensive federal court treatment of the question presented in
this article. But, of course, in considering the question and affirming
without further analysis, the Second Circuit did not have the guidance
of Bank Markazi and Patchak. What is more, the new and different
composition of the Supreme Court, at least warrants speculation
whether the Court might grant a petition for certiorari on the issue.
Perhaps, as is sometimes the case, Chief Justice Roberts’ dissents in
Bank Markazi and Patchak could prove influential.
Outside the context of the federal courts, at least two state high
courts have addressed the thesis of this Article. First, in Firelock Inc. v.
District Court, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the
state’s Mandatory Arbitration Act violated the state’s separation of
powers doctrine.156 The court held there was no separation of powers
violation.157 It reasoned that this was because the arbitration panel
did not perform a judicial function158 and—perhaps most importantly—because the arbitrator’s decision was non-binding.159 For
this latter reason, the court concluded the arbitrator was not exercising the sovereign power of the state—the judicial power—because the
arbitrator did not “possess the final authority to render and enforce a
judgment.”160 This is an important distinction from the FAA, whereby
parties wholly agree to forego their right to a judicial forum and proceed to binding arbitration. Accordingly, Firelock does not cut against
the argument that the FAA is an impermissible rule of decision.
153. See generally Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (upholding
the validity of clauses delegating authority to determine arbitrability of a dispute to an
arbitrator).
154. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 139; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345
(Am. Law Inst. 1981).
155. Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 344 (2d Cir. 2015).
156. 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
157. Id. at 1099.
158. Id. at 1095.
159. Id. at 1094.
160. Id.
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Second, in Atwater v. Commissioner of Education, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered whether mandatory arbitration under the state’s Education Reform Act of 1993 violated the
state’s separation of powers principle.161 There, a teacher alleged
wrongful dismissal but was required to arbitrate the claim.162 The
court held there was no separation of powers violation because there
was no interference with the core judicial functions of the courts.163
Specifically, the court noted that the arbitrator was acting in a very
limited role: only reviewing dismissal decisions, of which there were
expressly limited grounds.164 The court concluded these were legislative decisions.165 Of course, like Firelock, Atwater only draws attention
to the FAA’s all-encompassing reach, whereby parties may agree to
arbitrate all their claims, not like the limited reach of the law at issue
in that case. Thus, like Firelock, Atwater ultimately supports the thesis
of this Article.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Assuming this Article’s thesis is correct as a matter of doctrine,
the inquiry now becomes speculative. This Article concludes by postulating how courts might receive a fulsome challenge to the FAA under a rules of decision theory.
A. ANALOGOUS PAST CHALLENGES AND TREATMENT BY THE FEDERAL
COURTS
The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed
whether the FAA constitutes an impermissible rule of decision. The
Court has, however, addressed an analogous question for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court addressed whether the CFTC
violated Article III because Congress gave the CFTC jurisdiction to entertain state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings.166 The
Court considered whether the “essential attributes” of the judicial
power were reserved to Article III courts alone and the extent to
which Congress could permit adjudication of a right normally

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

957 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. 2011).
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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adjudicated in the federal courts by a different body.167 But the Court
held the CFTC did not violate separation of powers concerns:
Congress gave the CFTC the authority to adjudicate such matters, but the decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the
federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is unaffected. In such
circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished, for it seems
self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute
out of court or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the
separation of powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their
differences.168

This result squares with the Court’s FAA jurisprudence. Indeed, arbitration is often referred to simply as another means of forum selection.169 The Court’s decision in Schor suggests that Congress may encourage forum selection in a manner it sees fit, short of compelling
judicial action, and the power vested in the federal courts via Article
III does not suffer.
Because Schor found no Article III judicial actions present, that
case provides a natural counter argument to this Article’s thesis. Suppose the framing of this Article is off-base, and the FAA does not direct
judicial action or compel certain results but instead merely provides
what the law is—in other words, that arbitration is the exclusive contract remedy courts may award under a certain set of factual circumstances. Such a legislative action seems within Congress’ power to enact. The problem, of course, is that this interpretation does not have a
basis in the text of the FAA. This is notwithstanding the statute’s description of arbitration agreements as “irrevocable”—a court still
must determine and order the award of a remedy where a litigant purports to breach a supposedly irrevocable contract by filing suit.170
Stated differently, if Congress intended the FAA to abrogate all other
common law contract remedies, it would have said so. The notion that
Congress intended arbitration to be the exclusive and only remedy in
certain contract actions is further undermined by the FAA’s allowance
for arbitration agreements to be invalidated “upon such grounds as

167. Id. at 851.
168. Id. at 855.
169. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (“An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”).
170. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Note, State Courts and the Federalization of Arbitration
Law, supra note 69.
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”171 The upshot here is that a challenge to the FAA as a rule of decision would
have the potential to clarify not only the rule of decision doctrine but
also the text and plain meaning of the FAA.
Setting aside decisional law, law reviews have been a welcome
home for arguments related to this Article’s thesis. In a 2012 article,
Professor Roger J. Perlstadt made a convincing case that under a literal reading of Article III, the FAA cannot pass constitutional muster.172 A literal reading of Article III, he contends, would lead to the
conclusion that arbitrators are exercising the judicial power by bindingly resolving disputes.173 As he put it, “[d]etermining facts, applying
the law to those facts, and ascertaining a remedy to be applied to the
parties is precisely what arbitrators do.”174 Of course, this power is
reserved to the life-tenured judges of Article III courts and their counterparts among the state sovereigns.
More recently, in a 2017 note, Matthew J. Stanford expounded on
the FAA’s shaky Article III underpinnings. He argues the law circumvents ordinary jurisdictional requirements because it directs judicial
action prior to a litigant needing to demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or proper venue.175 But, as with Professor Schwartz’s thesis regarding the FAA’s applicability to state courts,
even if the thesis is correct as a matter of logic, that does not mean it
is normatively true.176
B. THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
If the argument that the FAA is an impermissible rule of decision
is correct, then courts—both federal and state—may view the Act as
permitting courts to award a certain remedy, but not requiring courts
to do so. This conclusion is especially important as it relates to the federal courts. Even without considering the overlay of federalism and
sovereignty principles that governs the federal government’s relationship with state courts, there is a patent separation of powers problem created by Congress’ exercise of the federal judicial power. If the
FAA does create a rule of decision, then federal courts should enforce
arbitration agreements only to the extent they find arbitration is the
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Perlstadt, supra note 1, at 201.
Id. at 223–27.
Id. at 224.
Stanford, supra note 1, at 983.
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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appropriate contract remedy to award.177
Suppose that is correct; what might change? The short answer is
arbitration might be just as prevalent as it always has been. Where a
movant seeks to compel arbitration based on a valid contract, in many
(though certainly not all) cases, arbitration is likely the remedy a court
should award against the litigant who breached that contract by filing
suit. But perhaps courts could be honest about what they are doing—
that is, they enforce arbitration agreements because arbitration is a
procedure favored by Congress, not the only contractual remedy available to a party.178 For that to be the case, though, the Supreme Court
would seemingly have to overrule parts of Prima Paint and Southland.
Nonetheless, the Constitution does not deal in trifles, and if that outcome is what is required to ensure the legitimacy of our tripartite system of government, so be it.
Indeed, the Court might consider that outcome preferrable to
stacking the Southland house of cards any higher. This is particularly
true in light of the ubiquity of arbitration agreements and the fairness
concerns they raise in many contracts of adhesion in employment and
consumer contracts.179 If it is true that the Court favors arbitration
both because it lessens the docket of the federal courts and increases
economic efficiency in the nation at large,180 the Court can only increase its institutional standing by recognizing that arbitration is an
allowable (and, indeed, favored) procedure for courts to apply to
pending cases when presented with the appropriate motion—not a
substantive contract remedy. Bolstering this conclusion is the canon
of constitutional avoidance, which guides the Court in choosing a plausible constitutional reading of a statute as opposed to a plausible unconstitutional one.181
177. And, of course, there could be no net change in the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, for arbitration is favored as a forum as much by the Supreme Court as by
Congress. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
178. Though this Article analyzes the apparent problem from the perspective of
the judiciary, it is also true that Congress could amend the FAA to provide greater clarity.
179. For instance, several years ago, a group of Harvard Law students, exercising
their considerable bargaining power in one of the most rarified corners of the job market, organized a movement for law students not to sign mandatory arbitration agreements in their own employment contracts. See Stephanie Francis Ward, A Group of Harvard Law Students Is Trying to Get Rid of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, ABA J. (Sept. 1,
2019),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/parity-to-the-people
[https://perma.cc/689D-BN6Y].
180. See discussion supra Part II.
181. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (explaining the constitutional
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Ultimately, analysis of the rules of decision doctrine leads to the
conclusion that the FAA may be applied by courts just like any other
contract remedy. Through the FAA, Congress has made clear that arbitration contracts are on equal footing with other contracts. But the
result of that intent should be—and should have always been—that a
court retains the power to determine the appropriate remedy when a
litigant purports to breach an arbitration agreement. Unless arbitration is a mandatory procedure, it is but one remedy the court may order to remedy that breach.

avoidance principle).

